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PROCRASTINATION DOES PAY SOMETIMES: HOW THE DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING BASEL II
REDUCED THE EFFECT OF THE SUBPRIME FINANCIAL CRISIS
By Raymond Bart Simmons
Walton College of Business
Faculty Mentor: Tim Yeager
Sam W. Walton College of Business
Abstract
Basel II, a major international regulatory capital revision,
was supposed to have been implemented in the U.S. by 2004,
but delays pushed it back more than five years. Basel II could
have lowered minimum capital standards and made the largest
banks even more vulnerable to the subprime financial crisis and
economic downturn had it been adopted before its onset in 2007.
Consequently, the procrastination in implementing Basel II made
the banking industry more stable as it entered the financial crisis.
In this study, the assets of the 11 largest bank holding companies
at year-end 2006 were separated into broad asset classes with
similar default characteristics as set forth under the second Basel
Accord. The hypothetical capital to be held by the BHCs against
their loans and leases was computed as required under Basel II
and compared with the actual capital the banks held at year-end
2006. Based on these computations, it appears that Basel II would
have made banks even more vulnerable to the financial crisis
had it been adopted earlier. Consequently, the procrastination in
implementing Basel II benefited both the banking industry and the
federal government. Among the 11 bank holding companies, total
capital could have decreased by more than $170 billion under Basel II compared to the actual capital being held. The change would
have amounted to a 29.7% decrease in total capital and a 52.9%
drop in capital held against loans and leases, both on a weightedaverage basis. Without question, Basel II needs to be adjusted to
be more conservative.
Overview of the Basel Accords
Capital provides a firm with a buffer to absorb losses. All
other factors being equal, more capital reduces the likelihood of
failure because shareholders bear the losses, and, unlike bondholders, shareholders have no legal claim to recoup their equity
investment. However, equity is expensive because shareholders
require relatively high rates of return given their first-loss position.
Consequently, most firms would prefer to finance their operations
with a mixture of debt and equity. An important strategic decision
for any firm is to determine the optimal level of capital. As a firm’s
level of equity increases, investors are willing to purchase the
firm’s debt at relatively low interest rates. In unregulated markets,
a firm will choose a capital level that balances the high cost of capital with the lower cost of debt issuance to achieve a low overall
cost of capital. Banks, however, operate in regulated markets.
Following the wave of bank failures during the Great Depression, Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
to insure domestic deposits. Deposit insurance provides banks with
incentives to reduce capital and increase debt (including deposits)
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because insured depositors are willing to lend their funds to banks
at risk-free rates of return regardless of the bank’s level of capital.
Since the market cannot effectively discipline banks’ incentives to
hold an appropriate amount of capital, bank regulators must step in
to ensure that minimum capital levels are held. The Basel Capital
Accord is a regulatory framework that establishes minimum capital holdings for banking organizations.
Basel I, drafted in 1988 and implemented in the US in 1992,
was the first international accord to set uniform, international
capital standards (BIS, 2003.) The innovation of Basel I was to
adjust minimum capital requirements for a bank’s credit risk. Over
time, however, Basel I was criticized by the industry as being too
insensitive to a bank’s true credit risks. In the late 1990s, development of Basel II was begun to help better align bank risk and the
capital held at each bank.
Although Basel II contains three methods for determining
capital requirements, the United States has adopted only the most
complex method, called the advanced measurement approach
(AMA). Even then, only the very largest banks—perhaps the largest dozen—will implement Basel II. The other 7,000+ banks will
continue to operate under Basel I. Basel II has drawn criticism
from some regulators and analysts for two primary reasons. First,
as Emmons, Lskavyan, and Yeager (2005) argue, the different
methods of computing minimum capital requirements can result in
giving Basel II banks a competitive advantage over Basel I banks.
Second, Basel II may exacerbate economic business cycles because it requires relatively small amounts of capital during booms
and large amounts of capital during recessions.
The competitive advantage issue between Basel I and Basel II
can be shown by comparing the capital requirements for a generic
$200,000 retail mortgage loan. Under Basel I, all retail mortgages
are put into the 50% risk weight bracket. The current economic
conditions or the creditworthiness of the borrower has no bearing
on this determination of risk. The risk-weighted assets for the loan
would be $100,000, derived by multiplying the risk weight by the
value of the loan. Basel I specifies that banks hold a minimum of
8% of risk-weighted assets in the form of capital; therefore, the
minimum required capital for the loan would be $8,000.
Basel II places emphasis on the bank’s internal assessment of
risk instead of assigning loans to predetermined buckets with arbitrary risk weights (BIS, 2005.) The necessary capital under Basel
II requires internal estimates of the probability of default (PD),
loss given default (LGD), and the correlation factor (R), which is
discussed in greater detail later. As an example, let’s assume that
1
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PD, LGD, and R equal 1.17%, 20.3%, and 0.15, respectively. To
determine the loan’s required capital percentage, the bank would
put the variables into the following formula provided by the regulators:
Capital requirement (K) =
LGD × N [(1 - R) ^ -0.5 × G
(PD) + (R / (1 - R))^0.5 × G (0.999)] - PD x LGD
By doing so, the bank would compute the capital requirement for
the residential mortgage under Basel II to be $4,516 or 2.26% of
the value of the loan.
This simple comparison of the required capital for the same
loan under Basel I and Basel II illustrates the possible competitive
advantage for banks operating under Basel II. If a bank can fund
a loan with less equity, its overall cost of capital is lower, which
potentially allows it to lend at lower interest rates and take away
business from other banks. Calem and Follain (2007) performed
some benchmark calculations that suggested a significant potential
shift of market share and income to the largest banking institutions
in the mortgage market. In addition, Berger (2006) studied the
likely competitive effects of the implementation of Basel II capital
requirements on U.S. banks in the market for credit to small and
medium enterprises (SMEs). He found only relatively minor competitive effects on most community banks because the large Basel
II adopters tend to make very different types of SME loans to different types of borrowers than community banks. However, there
may be significant adverse effects on the competitive positions of
large Basel I banking organizations.
A second concern with the Basel II framework is that it is
procyclical, encouraging banks to hold less capital during periods
of economic growth and more capital during recessionary periods.
Kashyap and Stein (2004, p. 28) write that “our simulations suggest that the new Basel II capital requirements have the potential
to create an amount of additional cyclicality in capital charges that
is, at a minimum, economically significant, and that may be—depending on a bank’s customer mix and the credit-risk models that
it uses—quite large.” Gordy and Howells (2006) argue that the
“new capital standards will exacerbate business cycle fluctuations.
In brief, the idea is that, in a downturn when a bank’s capital base
is likely being eroded by loan losses, its existing (non-defaulted)
borrowers will be downgraded by the relevant credit-risk models,
forcing the bank to hold more capital against its current loan portfolio. To the extent that it is difficult or costly for the bank to raise
fresh external capital in bad times, it will be forced to cut back
on its lending activity, thereby contributing to a worsening of the
initial downturn.
Research Question
This paper addresses the cyclicality of Basel II by estimating
the potential reduction in capital requirements for banks adopting
Basel II had the new framework been adopted just before the onset
of the financial crisis in 2007. The AMA approach enables banks
to use internal estimates to determine minimum capital requirements, and the default probability of a loan is a key estimated
input. If banks underestimate “true” default probabilities, they may
end up holding less capital than necessary. For example, mort-

gages and mortgage-backed securities had historically low default
probabilities prior to the recent financial crisis. Due to their history
of low default risk and high credit ratings, it could be hypothesized
that, under Basel II, most banks would have held lower capital
against their mortgages and mortgage-backed securities than they
held under Basel I. Consequently, during the surge of sub-prime
residential lending, large quantities of these securities would not
have been properly assessed for their credit risk.
Thus the research question is, would Basel II have lowered
minimum capital standards and made banks even more vulnerable
to the financial crisis had it been adopted before the onset of the
crisis? If so, the procrastination in implementing Basel II made the
banking industry more stable as it entered the financial crisis.
Research Methodology
In determining the Bank Holding Companies (BHC) to
include in this sample, the 11 largest banks were selected according to total assets as of December 31, 2006, the period of time just
before the onset of the crisis. Implementing the Basel II Accord
requires more time and effort from the BHCs; therefore, it would
have been adopted by only a select number of the largest institutions as determined by the United States regulators. The bank
holding companies used in this research are shown in Table 1:
Table 1. Bank Holding Company Total Assets As of December 31, 2006 ($000s)

Bank Holding Company

Total Assets

Citigroup, Inc.

1,884,318,000

Bank of America Corporation

1,463,685,485

JPMorgan Chase & Co.

1,351,520,000

W achovia Corporation

707,121,000

Wells Fargo & Company

481,996,000

HSBC North America Holdings, Inc.

478,025,477

Taunus Corporation

431,865,000

Barclays Group US, Inc.

261,111,792

US Bancorp

219,232,000

Countrywide Financial Corporation

199,946,230

SunTrust Banks Inc.

182,161,609

The next step was to find the account values for all of the
loans and leases at each of the BHCs so that these values could
be mapped into the Basel II capital formula. These loan numbers
can be located in Schedule HC-C, Loans and Lease Financing
Receivables in the FR Y-9C filings, which are the report forms on
the consolidated financial statements to be filed by bank holding
companies with total consolidated assets of $500 million or more.
The Schedule HC-C shows the full breakdown of the company’s
loans and leases on their balance sheets. The main categories
include real estate loans, loans to financial institutions, commercial
and industrial loans, loans to individuals, and other loans. 1
Next, loans and leases as reported in FR Y-9C were converted
to the classification system used in the Basel II Accord. Under the
Internal Ratings Based approach to Basel II, banks must allocate

The schedule also allocates account balances as domestic and/or consolidated. In order to obtain the individual account balances for all real estate
loans, I had to solve for foreign real estate holdings. The foreign real estate was only included in the total consolidated figure for real estate loans.
Therefore, foreign real estate can only be found using the total consolidated loans secured by real estate and subtracting the sum of all loans secured by
real estate in domestic offices. This process allows the total loan values to equal the BHCs’ total consolidated loans and leases as reported.

1
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their exposures into different classes of assets with different underlying risk characteristics. Unlike the classification system used
for loans in the FR Y9-C reports, loans and leases made according to Basel II are categorized by five main groupings: corporate,
sovereign, bank, retail, and equity. Beyond the five main classes,
the corporate asset class is divided into five sub-classes, and the
retail asset class is separated into three separate sub-classes. The
FR Y9-C loan categories can be mapped into the following eight
Basel II categories:
Retail Mortgage:
3 Revolving, open-end loans secured by 1-4 family residential
		 properties and extended under lines of credit
3 Closed-end loans secured by 1-4 family residential
		properties
Qualified Revolving Retail Exposures:
3 Credit card and other revolving credit plans
Small and Medium Enterprise Retail:
3 Loans to finance agricultural production and other loans to
		farmers
3 Lease financing receivables
Other Retail:
3 Other consumer loans including single payment,
		 installment, and all student loans
Wholesale Corporate:
3 Commercial and industrial to U.S. and non-U.S. addresses
(domicile)
Wholesale Bank:
3 Loans to U.S. banks and other U.S. depository institutions
3 Loans for purchasing and carrying securities
3 Loans to foreign banks
3 All other loans to financial institutions
Wholesale Sovereign:
3 Loans to foreign governments and official institutions
Small and Medium Enterprise Corporate:
3 Construction, land development, and other land loans
3 Commercial real estate loans secured by non-farm non		 residential properties, multifamily residential properties, or
		farmland
3 Foreign real estate holdings
The next step was to determine the estimates for the three
main variables in the required capital formula under Basel II: the
probability of default, the loss given default, and the exposure at
default. Probability of default is the chance that a given loan will
enter into default before it reaches maturity expressed in the form
of a percentage. Loss given default is defined as the portion of the
initial loan balance that will not be recovered if the borrower defaults on the loan. To correctly calculate the probability of default
for the different asset classes requires knowledge of the number of
loans that went into default for the given period and prior periods
compared to the total number of loans outstanding of a given type.
Unfortunately, all of the financial statement data on the FRY-9C
forms are account balance totals. No information is provided on
individual loans.
Fortunately, the Fifth Quantitative Impact Study conducted
by the Bank for International Settlements on 382 banks worldwide
estimates the PD and LGD for each sample BHC (BIS, 2006.)
Published by ScholarWorks@UARK, 2010

This impact study was the last trial run of Basel II to evaluate the
potential changes in the minimum required capital levels under
Basel II; thus, it contains the most recent changes proposed to the
accord in June of 2004 prior to its delay because of the economic
crisis. The appropriate data to use were those from the weightedaverage estimates of PD and LGD across all eight asset classes of
the G10 Group 1 because of its relevance to the 11 banks chosen
for this study. Exposure at default (EAD) was set at the total value
of the loans and leases for each of the asset classes. The estimates
of PD and LGD gathered from the Fifth Quantitative Impact Study
were used for each of the 11 BHCs in the sample and are shown in
Table 2.
Table 2. Estimates of PD and LGD for G10 Group 1 Banks from QIS5
R e tail
Retail Mortgage

Qualifying Revolving
Exposure

Other

Small and Medium
Enterprise

Loss Given Default (LGD)

20.3%

71.6%

48.0%

46.2%

Probability of Default (PD)

1.17%

2.95%

3.45%

2.99%

Corporate

W holesale
Bank

Loss Given Default (LGD)

39.8%

40.9%

33.3%

35.0%

Probability of Default (PD)

0.99%

0.27%

0.12%

2.10%

Sovereign

SME
Corporate

A key determinant of the riskiness of an asset is its sensitivity
to adverse economic events. The formula for calculating required
minimum capital for Basel II requires a systemic correlation factor
which measures the relationship between different types of loans
and some unspecified adverse event. For instance, imagine that a
bank has two loans outstanding with a value of $50,000 each. The
first loan is to a blue-collar worker with no savings, and the second
is to a local businessman with a large net worth. If the economy
turns for the worse, the blue-collar worker is more likely to lose
his job and be forced to default on the loan despite all attempts to
pay it off. Although still affected by the economic downturn, the
local business person is more likely to repay the loan.
This sensitivity to outside factors could also be based on the
type of asset or other factors. While the formula for the systematic
correlation factor is similar for all bank exposures, the ranges of
correlations differ between retail and non-retail exposures. For
corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures, the maximum and minimum correlations are set at 0.24 and 0.12, respectively. However,
for retail exposures, the systematic correlation factors range from
0.03 to 0.16. For results between the maximum and the minimum,
the correlation for each asset class differs because of the use of
the historical average probability of default as the sole input in the
formula. The higher the average probability of default, the lower
its systematic correlation will be, and vice versa. For example, if
a loan has an extremely high probability of default, the external
factors cannot increase the chances for default much higher than
they already are; therefore, the correlation factor will be lower.
For retail mortgages and qualifying revolving retail exposures, the
correlation factors are given as 0.15 and 0.04, respectively, without
the use of a formula.
Correlation (R) for corporate, soverigh, or bank exposure =
0.12 × (1 – EXP (-50 × PD)) / (1 – EXP (-50)) + 0.24 × [1 - (1
– EXP (-50 × PD)) / (1 – EXP (-50))]
Correlation (R) for retail exposure =
0.03 × (1 – EXP (-35 × PD)) / (1 – EXP (-35)) +0.16 × [1 - (1
– EXP (-35 × PD)) / (1 – EXP (-35))]
3

Inquiry: The University of Arkansas Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 11 [2010], Art. 16
100  inquiry  Volume 11 2010
The final components in capital formula for non-retail exposures are the maturity adjustment and average maturity. The
weighted-average maturity of all loans except the residential
mortgage loans were obtained from Schedule RC-C of the Federal
call reports for each of the BHCs. The problem is that call reports
are done on the bank level and not by the bank holding company.
Consequently, each BHC was matched with its national- and statechartered banks. Schedule RC-C of the call report divides residential mortgages and other mortgages into the following maturity
brackets: three months or less, three months to a year, one to three
years, three to five years, five to fifteen years, and over fifteen
years. A weighted-average formula was then created to compute
the average remaining maturity of non-residential mortgages to be
used in the maturity adjustment, which only applies to non-retail
exposures. The formula used the median of each of the maturity
brackets times the value of the loans in that bracket. The next step
was to take the sum of the brackets and divide that value by the
sum of all of the brackets to end up with the weighted-average
maturity of all loans for that type. Under Basel II, the maturity
adjustment is calculated using the following formula:
Maturity adjustment (b) = (0.11852 – 0.05478 × ln (PD)) ^2
Last, the required minimum capital ratio for each BHC was
determined by using the formula and these inputs: PD, LGD,
EAD, correlation factor, maturity adjustment, and average maturity. As a reminder, the maturity portion of the formula is only
used for corporate, bank, and sovereign bank exposures.
Capital requirement (K) =
LGD × N [(1 - R) ^ -0.5 × G
(PD) + (R / (1 - R))^0.5 × G (0.999)] - PD x LGD
Capital requirement (K) =
[LGD × N [(1 - R) ^-0.5 × G
(PD) + (R / (1 - R))^0.5 ×
w/ maturity adjustment
G (0.999)] – PD x LGD] x (1
- 1.5 x b) ^ -1 × (1 + (M - 2.5) × b)
To find the actual dollar value of required capital, the required
capital percentages were simply multiplied by the EAD to calculate the actual capital required under Basel II for each loan type.
To illustrate, the required capital calculated for a consumer loan
is 5.5%, and the loan value is $20,000. Since EAD equals the
value of the consumer loan, the required capital is $1,100 or 0.055
x $20,000. Then, the required capital was totaled for each asset
class to determine the amount of capital under Basel II based on
previous assumptions to be held for each bank holding company.
Remember that the required capital is only the capital to be held
against the loans and leases of the BHCs.
In order to find the estimated amount of total regulatory capital, the difference between the estimated capital held against loans
and leases and the actual capital held had to be calculated and
then subtracted from the total regulatory capital the bank holding
company held as of December 31, 2006, under Basel I regulations. Even though the consolidated financial statements clearly
stated the total regulatory capital held as of December 2006, the
capital being held only against the loans and leases was needed.
The actual risk-weighted assets held against loans and leases were
multiplied by the total risk-based capital ratio. This allowed the
most direct comparison between the real capital being held against
loans and leases and the estimates resulting from the research. To
https://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry/vol11/iss1/16

get the actual capital held, Schedule HC-R of the FR Y9-C for the
BHCs was used to find the total risk-based capital. The following
demonstration shows the steps to calculate the estimated amount
of total regulatory capital for Bank of America Corporation.
1. Calculate the risk-weighted assets of the loans and leases
2. Multiply the risk-weighted assets ($) by the total risk-based
		 capital ratio:
		 RWA x TRBC = Capital LnL
		 560,812,349 x 11.88% = 66,624,507
3. Subtract the actual capital from the estimated capital held
		 against loans and leases:
		 Actual Capital LnL – Estimated Capital LnL = Difference
		 Capital LnL
			
$ 66,624,507 – $ 33,334,731 = $ 33,289,776
4. Subtract the difference in capital for loans and leases from
		 the actual total capital:
		 Actual Total Capital – Difference Capital LnL = Estimated
		 Total Capital
			
$ 125,225,775 – $ 33,289,776 = $ 91,935,999
In order to calculate the estimated risk-weighted assets according to the estimate of Basel II capital derived in this study,
the capital was divided by the total risk-based capital ratio. First,
eight percent was used as the TRBC because it is the minimum
level acceptable under Basel II. Next, the risk-weighted assets
were calculated based on the risk-based capital ratio unique to
the bank holding companies as of December 31, 2006. For all 11
institutions, the ratios were higher than the required ratio of eight
percent, resulting in an even lower figure for risk-weighted assets.
After completing the estimations of required capital and
risk-weighted assets under the Basel II, the actual data from the
bank holding companies for comparison were looked up. Schedule
HC-R Regulatory Capital gives loan and lease value totals and
allocates them to the correct risk-weight bucket. Therefore, to calculate the actual risk-weighted assets for the BHCs as of December 31, 2006, the values for each bucket were multiplied by the
corresponding risk weight and added together to get the total risk
weighted assets (BIS, 2005.) However, the total reported capital
must also be equal to the sum of loans and leases held for sale and
loans and leases, net of unearned income, as reported in Schedule
HC: Consolidated Balance Sheet. Hence, the same calculation was
performed for both the loans and leases, net of unearned income,
and the loans and leases held for sale. The need for this calculation was particularly evident when it became apparent that some
institutions had a majority of their loans and leases classified as
held for sale. An important note is that, even though an institution
may be attempting to sell loans, it still controls the loans. The bank
holding company is still required to hold the capital against the
loans just as if they planned to hold them in portfolio.
Results
Based on the results of this study, Basel II would have made
banks even more vulnerable to the financial crisis had it been
adopted earlier. Consequently, the procrastination in implementing Basel II benefited both the banking industry as a whole and
the federal government. Among the 11 bank holding companies,
4
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total capital could have decreased by more than $170 billion under
Basel II compared to the actual capital being held. The decrease
would have amounted to a 29.7% decrease in total capital and
a 52.9% drop in capital held against loans and leases, both on a
weighted-average basis. For example, Citigroup Inc., the largest
BHC as of December 2006, held $68.1 billion in capital against
its loans and leases. According to the calculations, Citigroup Inc.
could have held as little as $31.3 billion in capital against its loans,
a decrease of 54.1%. Overall, the 11 banks held $321.3 billion in
capital against their loans and leases compared to the $151.3 billion minimum capital that was calculated under Basel II.
For total capital held, the differences between the actual and
the estimates under Basel II remain the same as those from the
capital held against loans and leases. This similarity is due to
the fact that Basel II applies only to the calculation of required
capital in a BHC’s loan and lease portfolio. However, the percentage changes in total capital still illustrate the degree to which the
banking industry would have suffered further during the recent
economic crisis. Wells Fargo, for example, had total capital of
$51.5 billion at year-end 2006. Even today, banks are still struggling with new foreclosures and high loan losses. Just imagine
how much worse off Wells Fargo would be today if it had held
only $30.1 billion in capital, as calculated using the Basel II formula for required capital. This picture would have been the same
for virtually all banks that would have adopted Basel II prior to the
economic crisis. All of these BHCs would have run out of capital
much sooner than they actually did. The complete statistics for
capital held against loans and leases, total capital, and risk-weighted assets for all 11 BHCs are presented in Tables 3 through 5 at the
end of this paper.
Conclusions
The second Basel Accord was intended to promote a more
forward-looking approach to capital supervision, one that would
encourage banks to identify the risks they may face, today and in
the future, and to develop or improve their ability to manage those
risks. Despite this intent, Basel II definitely has major flaws. The
main flaw is its reliance on historical data in determining a BHC’s
level of credit risk. The present study shows without question that
Basel II needs to be adjusted to be more conservative. Although
there is nothing inherently wrong in financial institutions’ wanting to hold a minimum amount of capital and not one cent more
than needed, it does leave the banking industry more vulnerable in
times of economic downturn, as the past several years have shown.
Fortunately, now that history has clearly demonstrated that there
is more risk than previously thought, the implementation of Basel
II is somewhat self-correcting. The key internal estimates made by
each BHC will be altered to be more conservative, thus hopefully
providing a safer financial position for the banking industry in the
years to come. Nevertheless, a portion of the change should come
from changes to the Basel Accord and its formulas. Indeed, regulators are currently preparing what some are calling “Basel III” to be
released by year-end 2010. (BIS, 2009.)
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Table 3. Capital Held Against Loans & Leases ($000s)
Bank of America Corporation
Barclays Group US, Inc.
Citigroup, Inc.

Actual Capital
66,624,507

Hypothetical Basel II
Capital
33,334,731

1,730,225

730,694

-57.77%

68,060,733

31,248,100

-54.09%

Percent Change
-49.97%

Countrywide Financial Corporation

8,177,335

2,828,537

-65.41%

HSBC North America Holdings, Inc.

27,355,553

10,847,357

-60.35%

JPMorgan Chase & Co.

49,903,491

20,318,755

-59.28%

SunTrust Banks, Inc.

12,125,812

6,964,409

-42.57%

Taunus Corporation

-1,287,955

1,450,179

-212.60%

US Bancorp

16,538,133

7,636,451

-53.83%

Wachovia Corporation

34,867,305

20,072,791

-42.43%

W ells Fargo & Company

37,184,413

15,845,438

-57.39%

321,279,550

151,277,443

Total

Equally weighted percent change in capital

-68.70%

Weighted average percent change in capital

-52.91%

Table 4. Total Capital ($000s)
Bank of America Corporation
Barclays Group US, Inc.
Citigroup Inc.
Countrywide Financial Corporation
HSBC North America Holdings, Inc.
JPMorgan Chase & Co.
SunTrust Banks, Inc.
Taunus Corporation
US Bancorp
Wachovia Corporation
W ells Fargo & Company
Total

Actual Capital
125,225,775
3,491,551
123,260,000
17,031,228
38,338,644
115,265,000
18,024,866
-3,776,000
24,495,000
60,194,000
51,427,000
572,977,064

Hypothetical Basel II
Capital
91,935,999
2,492,021
86,447,367
11,682,430
21,830,448
85,680,264
12,863,463
-1,037,865
15,593,318
45,399,487
30,088,025
402,974,957

Equally weighted percent change in capital
Weighted average percent change in capital

Percent Change
-26.58%
-28.63%
-29.87%
-31.41%
-43.06%
-25.67%
-28.63%
-72.51%
-36.34%
-24.58%
-41.49%

-35.34%
-29.67%

Table 5. Risk-Weighted Assets of Loans and Leases ($000s)

Bank of America Corporation
Barclays Group US, Inc.
Citigroup, Inc.
Countrywide Financial Corporation
HSBC North America Holdings, Inc.
JPMorgan Chase & Co.
SunTrust Banks, Inc.
Taunus Corporation
US Bancorp
Wachovia Corporation
Wells Fargo & Company
Total

Actual RiskWeighted Assets
560,812,349
15,097,947
584,212,300
63,885,430
245,561,518
405,060,800
109,143,221
33,280,500
131,463,700
307,743,200
297,475,300
2,753,736,265

Weighted average percent change in RWA

Hypothetical Basel II Hypothetical RiskRisk-Weighted
Weighted Assets @
Assets
8% RBC
280,595,381
416,684,141
6,376,043
9,133,681
268,224,032
390,601,247
22,097,947
35,356,716
97,373,047
135,591,968
164,924,958
253,984,435
62,685,948
87,055,111
-37,472,332
18,127,241
60,703,110
95,455,640
177,164,972
250,909,892
126,763,501
198,067,970
1,229,436,608
1,890,968,043
-55.35%

-31.33%
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Mentor comments: Dr. Tim Yeager has nothing but praise for
Bart Simmons’ independence and planning in executing this important piece of research.
In October 2008, the largest U.S. banks such as Citigroup and
Bank of America were on the brink of failure threatening to
pull the economy into a full-blown depression. Just a few years
before, regulators were so impressed with the health and stability of the banking system that they began a process called Basel
II to reduce the amount of capital banks were required to hold to
protect against failure. The implementation process dragged on
for several years so that, even now in 2010, Basel II has never

https://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry/vol11/iss1/16

been put into effect. Had Basel II been in place on the eve of the
financial crisis, how much less capital might banks have held, and
consequently, how much worse might the crisis have been? Bart
Simmons was an undergraduate Finance and Accounting major
in my advanced banking course when we discussed Basel II. He
immediately identified this as a research topic that was difficult
and complicated enough to interest him, and he approached me
about doing his thesis on this important topic. I don’t know of any
other research by students or professors alike that explores this
issue. Like most students, Bart set aggressive deadlines for working on his project. Unlike most students, he met or exceeded those
deadlines. Bart worked independently on his research, including
making his way through complex statistical formulas. With little
guidance from me, he constructed and completed his empirical
tests. When it came time for writing up the results, Bart put together a draft of which many of my PhD students would be proud.
I worked with him to polish up the rough edges, but he had clearly
articulated his research question and methodology, and described
the results. Bart found that procrastination does indeed pay sometimes because delays in implementing Basel II allowed the banking
system to have more capital than it would have had otherwise.
Bart also knows that procrastination does not pay when it comes
to conducting thorough and high-quality research. He proved that
as well with his timely and diligent efforts on this important topic.
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